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Interactions between monetary and fiscal policy depend on the 
specification of policy variables that fiscal policy uses. However, a general 
rule is that when monetary policy is capable of dealing with sticky price 
adjustment, a primary concern of fiscal authority should be to remedy the 
resource allocation. My regression study using cross-country data shows 
that in a majority of OECD countries fiscal policy relies on the automatic 
stabilizer. Japan is a unique case in that it relies heavily on discretionary 
fiscal policy. However, Japanese policymakers have recently changed their 
thinking regarding fiscal policy.     
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1. Introduction 
 
In the discussion of policy mix in the intermediate macroeconomics textbook, 
monetary policy and fiscal policy play an equal role in stabilizing economic fluctuations. 
However, recent theory and practice presumes the division of labor regarding policies. 
Fiscal policy is in charge of resource allocation, while monetary policy addresses 
economic stabilization. The purpose of this paper is to discuss how and when theory 
justifies this kind of separation, as well as to empirically examine how developed 
countries have accepted this idea.   
This paper will first give a theoretical review as means of introducing our 
discussion of the separation of monetary and fiscal policy. Recently the analysis of 
monetary policy has dramatically advanced from the new Keynesian framework which 
established a solid micro foundation of behavioral equations. A consideration of fiscal 
policy under this framework has been newly developed by recent researchers such as 
Benigno and Woodford (2003), Eggertsson and Woodford (2004), Schmitt-Grohe and 
Uribe (2004) and Siu (2004). Under optimal policy management by a consolidated 
government, monetary authority and fiscal authority seek to maximize a singular 
objective function while under the same restrictions. Policy variables are included in the 
consolidated government’s budget equation. In general, monetary policy and fiscal 
policy closely interact; monetary policy cannot ignore fiscal concerns, while fiscal 
policy should be concerned with output fluctuations. However, the above-mentioned 
literature also characterized specific cases where the interaction between monetary and 
fiscal policy was inherently weak. In these situations, ignoring the interplay between 
monetary and fiscal policy is accepted as good practice.   
Taylor (2000) empirically examined the practice of fiscal policy in the United 
States. He focused on the relationship between the structural balance of government and 
the output gap. He found that the structural balance did not respond to the output gap. 
This implies that fiscal authority abandons discretionary policy and that fiscal policy 
sticks to an automatic stabilizer. On the other hand, Gali and Perotti (2003) examined 
how the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact affected fiscal policy in 
EU countries, and found that fiscal policy had become more countercyclical in the 
post-Maastricht period (1992-2000).  
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Section 2 will be a discussion of the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy 
under the new Keynesian framework. In Section 3, the paper will take a look at the 
recent practice of other OECD countries as well as examining the specific case of Japan. 
My regression study using cross-country data indicates that fiscal policy works as an 
automatic stabilizer in many OECD countries. Japan belongs to the opposite case; the 
structural balance responds strongly to the output gap. In Section 4, the paper will 
further analyze the Japanese situation as well as identify key issues facing Japanese 
fiscal policy.   
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2.  Interaction Between Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
 
2.1 Market Failures in the new Keynesian framework 
This section gives a brief overview of the theoretical framework of monetary and 
fiscal policy from the viewpoint of new Keynesian economics. A principal focus of the 
new Keynesian framework is to give a solid micro foundation of price adjustments. 
Since the model needs to formulate the firm’s price setting behavior, they must have 
some market power. Therefore, the model contains market failure caused by imperfect 
competition. Market power and sticky price adjustment force the economy to diverge 
from the point of efficient resource allocation. The business cycle caused by the sticky 
price adjustment is a market failure. Therefore, stabilization policy is a tool utilized by 
the government to intervene and remedy market failure.   
It is useful to decompose the fluctuation of output; market failure caused by 
imperfect competition and market failure caused by the sticky price adjustment. Let us 
denote the actual output as  t Y , the output under flexible price adjustment (natural 
output) as 
n
t Y , and the output under efficient resource allocation (efficient output) as 
*
t Y . Since the main concern of monetary policy is the cyclical fluctuations caused by the 
sticky price, monetary theory usually focuses on the output gap  ( )
n
t t t Y Y x log ≡ . On 
the other hand, since the evaluation of economic welfare is defined based on its 
deviation from efficient resource allocation, another important variable to consider is 
the difference between the actual output and the efficient output  ( )
* log t t t Y Y y ≡ .   
Current research on monetary policy usually describes the movement of inflation 
and the output gap using the Expectation IS curve and the new Keynesian Phillips 
curve.
1  Following Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2004), 
this paper presents a model that incorporates fiscal policy into the new Keynesian 
framework. The expectation IS curve is 
 
  () ( )
n
t t t t t t t r E i x E x − − + − = + + 1 1 1 log π σ   ,     (1) 
 
                                                  
1 For a derivation of the following equations, see Woodford (2003) and Benigno 
and Woodford (2003).    
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where σ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, i is the nominal interest rate, 
() 1 log − ≡ t t t P P π  is the inflation rate, and P is the price level. The natural interest rate 
n r  is the interest rate where the inflation rate is zero and the economy is at the natural 
level of output.   
The new Keynesian Phillips curve is described as 
 
  [] 1 ˆ + + + + = t t t t t t E u y π β τ ψ κ π   ,       ( 2 )  
 
which is derived from Calvo’s (1983) specification of firm’s price adjustment. In (2), κ 
is a parameter, and  τˆ   is the tax rate that affects the supply side of the economy, and u 
is a set of exogenous shock (other than the tax rate) to the efficient output and inflation, 
and  β is the discount factor of consumers. The above equation implies that the 
government can offset the shock by changing the tax rate. To highlight this fact, we 
rearrange the equation (2) to   
 
  ( ) [ ] 1
* ˆ ˆ + + − + = t t t t t t E y π β τ τ ψ κ π       ( 3 )  
 
where 
* ˆ τ  stands for the tax rate that exactly offsets the movement of u. If the fiscal 
authority sets  τˆ  as 
* ˆ τ , the difference between the efficient output and natural output 
remains constant. Even when the true objective of the consolidated government is to 
minimize the deviation of output from its efficient level, the monetary authority is 
allowed to be concerned with the deviation of output from its natural level.   
We consolidate the budget equations of the fiscal authority and the central bank 
into one. The budget equations of the consolidated government are shown as   
 
() t t t t t s P B i B − + = − − 1 1 1        ( 4 )  
t t t t t G Y s ζ τ − − ≡   ,         ( 5 )  
 
where B stands for the nominal public debt, s the primary balance, τ  the tax rate, and G 
government expenditure, ζ  exogenous transfer expenditure. The above equations can be  
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arranged as an equation for the real value of public debt ( P B b ≡ ): 
 
() () t t t t t
t
t
t t G Y b
P
P




1 1   .     (6) 
 
2.2 Settings of policy variables in the budget of the consolidated government 
Fiscal authority is responsible for controlling four variables in Equation (6). The 
characteristics of these variables warrant further discussion. G and ζ  are spending items. 
They are separated because the latter does not cause the distortion of resource allocation, 
while the former influences the natural output and the natural interest rate. Government 
expenditures are usually considered as exogenous shocks, because each governmental 
spending item has its own purpose which is separated from the scope of stabilization 
policy. However, aspects of these items may be used as stabilization policy. An 
alternative specification is to set ζ as a policy variable. Government debt is usually 
specified as a safe nominal debt. Alternative specification is that the government 
conducts a sophisticated debt management policy with the presence of state-contingent 
government debts. Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2004) 
use the tax rate as an instrument of stabilization policy. In contrast to monetary policy, it 
is impractical to frequently adjust tax rates in response to economic conditions.   
Taxation under a stabilization policy has been addressed in the context of tax 
smoothing behavior, which was discussed by Barro (1979). When the consumers have 
the infinite time horizon, and distortionary cost does not exist, Ricardian equivalence 
holds. When tax has distortionary costs, a higher tax rate leads to a larger welfare loss. 
For this reason the fiscal authority should keep the tax rate as smooth as possible. For 
example, the tax smoothing theory argues that when there is a temporary big fiscal 
demand, government should choose a persistent, small tax increases and issue a bond, 
rather than immediately passing a large tax increase. As a result, the fiscal deficit will 
increase during a period of high fiscal demand.   
Barro (1979) developed the tax smoothing theory under the real economy without 
the consideration of money. Bohn (1990), Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991) argued 
that when the price was flexible in a monetary economy, it was preferable to raise the 
inflation rate to correspond to a temporary increase in fiscal demand, which is contrary  
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to the discussion of the real economy. Beningo and Woodfored (2003), Schmit-Grobe 
and Uribe (2004) and Siu (2004) examined the tax smoothing theory when price 
adjustment was not flexible. In the case of sticky price adjustment in a monetary 
economy, the adjustment of fiscal shock through the manipulation of the inflation rate 
should lead to a change in income, thus possibly deteriorating the public welfare level. 
The implication for price stability critically depends on price adjustment speed. Under 
the reasonable price adjustment speed, price stability is still an important policy concern 
for the central bank, even if policy makers take account of government budget.   
 
2.3 Solvency of the consolidated government 
In order for the government to be solvent, the future government debt should 
satisfy the No-Ponzi Game (NPG) condition, which prohibits the real value of 
government debt from growing more than the discount rate. When the fiscal authority 
and the central bank independently determine policy variables, an important question is 
which is responsible for guaranteeing the solvency of the government. Sargent and 
Wallace (1981) is an influential study on this topic, and many studies followed it. There 
are three ideas about how the intertemporal budget constraint of the consolidated 
government should be satisfied through a conduct of monetary and fiscal policy.   
(1. Monetarist theory of inflation) The central bank independently determines the 
growth rate of money. Fiscal authority passively adjusts a primary balance, and assures 
the solvency of the budget.   
(2. Fiscal theory of inflation) The fiscal authority independently determines a 
primary balance other than seigniorage, and the central bank passively adjusts the 
growth rate of money, and guarantees the solvency of the budget.   
(3. Fiscal theory of the price level) The central bank and fiscal authority 
independently determine their respective policy variables, and the price level is adjusted 
to guarantee the solvency of the budget. This idea has recently become a hot issue.
2 
The first is a widely accepted idea. Sargent and Wallace (1981) extensively 
discussed the second idea, and many studies followed it. When evaluating the 
                                                  
2  Leeper (1991), Sims (1994) and Woodford (1994, 1995) are classical studies that 
advocate the fiscal theory of the price level. Critical views to this theory are found in 
Buiter (1999) and McCallum (2001).    
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plausibility of these theories, it is natural to think that fiscal policy should be adjusted, 
especially when we take into account of the quantitative impact of policy variables on 
the government budget. Table 1 calculates a primary balance and seigniorage of the last 
15 years in Japan. While the change in primary balance is several percents of GDP, the 
change in seigniorage is one digit smaller. Therefore, it would be very difficult to use 
seigniorage for the purpose of offsetting a change in the primary balance. Furthermore, 
a growth of seigniorage should be accompanied by a steep growth of inflation. Even if a 
required seigniorage is several percents of GDP, the economy would suffer from 
exorbitant inflation. Therefore, the fiscal authority should be responsible for the 
solvency.  
 
2.4 Fiscal policy under the new Keynesian framework 
Log-linearizing (6) around the steady state and rearranging it yields 
 









− + − − + − + = + − − t t b t b t t t t t y t t b t b t f y s s b E b y b f y s s b σ π β τ τ σ π τ  ,  
          ( 7 )  
 
where  () Y b b b t t − ≡ ˆ   is the deviation of public debt from the steady state 
denominated by the steady state output, f is a set of shocks affecting the budget of the 
government, and  Y s sb ≡   is the ratio of public debt to the output in the steady state. A 
variable with a bar stands for its steady state level. The derivation of (7) is described by 
Benigno and Woodford (2003).   
The utility of the representative consumer depends on consumption and leisure. 
From the model which derived (1), the second-order approximation of welfare can be 
written as   
 








t y λ π β   .        ( 8 )  
 
where λ is a parameter. Since the behavior of price adjustment and economic agents 
have a micro foundation, it is natural that the objective function of the monetary and Table 1: Primary Balance of General Government and Seigniorage
(Percent)
ʢA) ʢC) ʢD)
Year Primary balance Seigniorage Growth rate of
monetary base
1980 -3.1 0.6 8.7
1981 -2.6 0.7 10.1
1982 -2.1 0.0 0.3
1983 -1.3 0.6 7.7
1984 -0.2 0.3 4.9
1985 0.7 0.4 5.8
1986 1.2 0.5 6.4
1987 1.8 0.6 8.3
1988 2.9 0.9 12.3
1989 3.1 0.9 11.0
1990 3.7 0.9 11.4
1991 3.4 0.6 7.6
1992 0.2 0.0 -0.3
1993 -1.7 -0.1 -0.9
1994 -3.0 0.3 4.0
1995 -3.7 0.4 4.5
1996 -3.5 0.5 6.0
1997 -2.6 0.7 7.9
1998 -10.0 0.8 8.2
1999 -6.3 0.8 7.4
2000 -5.2 1.2 9.7
2001 -5.3 0.5 3.8
2002 -6.9 2.2 14.7
2003 -6.1 3.8 21.4
NoteʣAll numbers are based on fiscal year. (A) and (B) are a
percent of GDP. (A) Primary balance of general government is
calculated as net lending plus property income paid minus
property income received. (B) Seigniorage is calculated as a
product of the growth rate of monetary base and the average
stock of monetary base.
Source) (A) National Accounts, Cabinet Office. (C) for
monetary base, Bank of Japan. 
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fiscal policy should be based on the individual’s utility function.
3  
Lagrangian of the consolidated government can then be written as   
 
[] []





















− − − + − − − +
⎩
⎨
⎧ − − − + + ∑
t b t b t t t y t b t b t t
t
t t t t t t t
t
y s s b b y b y s s b
y y E
σ π β τ σ π ϕ
βπ τ ψ κ π ϕ λ π β
τ
 .  (9) 
 
Differentiating (A.12) with respect b y , ˆ , , τ π , we obtain the first-order conditions:   
 
  ( ) ( ) 0 1 , 2 2 1 , 1 1 = − + − + − − t t b t t t s ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ π      ( 1 0 . a )  




1 = + + − − −
− −
t b t b y t t s s b y ϕ σ ϕ σ κϕ λ    (10.b) 
 0 2 1 = + − t t b ϕ ψϕ τ        ( 1 0 . c )  
  1 , 2 2 + = t t t Eϕ ϕ         ( 1 0 . d )  
 
Due to the structure of the above equations, monetary authorities must be aware of 
fiscal concerns such as the impact of fiscal policy variables on the optimization problem 
and the impact of monetary policy variables on the budget equation of the consolidated 
government. 
With the aid of research by Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Eggertsson and 
Woodford (2004), I will examine specific cases where monetary authorities are not 
concerned with fiscal responsibilities.   
 
(a) Tax rate is not flexible and cannot be frequently adjusted. 
If the tax rate is difficult to adjust and cannot be use as an instrument of 
stabilization policy, (10.c) is not a part of optimality conditions. In this case, taking the 
first difference of (10.b) and substituting it into (10.a) yields 
 
                                                  
3 We assume the preference is separable between consumption and leisure. With 
this assumption, the consumption Euler equation is not affected by labor supply. For a 
derivation of (8), see Woodford (2003).    
- 9 - 


































π  . 
 (11) 
 
While this procedure is an alternative method of analyzing monetary policy in order to 
obtain an inflation targeting rule, it clearly indicates that fiscal concern directly affects 
the outcome of the targeting rule. The inflation rate should be related to the change in 
the fluctuation of output from the efficient level and the shock in the marginal cost of 
government spending.   
 
(b) Tax rate is flexible and can be frequently adjusted 
Utilizing (10.c), we can relate two Lagrange multipliers. As shown in Benigno and 
Woodford (2003),   
 







π π   .       ( 1 2 )  
 
The coefficients of inflation and the change in y are given in their paper. The current 
level of inflation is related with both past inflation and output.   
 
(c) No public debt in the long run   
Under the setting of the optimization problem, the central bank, which is 
concerned with inflation, should also take into account the fact that inflation reduces the 
real value of public debt. However, this interplay does not appear to concern the central 
bank when it conducts monetary policy. Consider a case where this interaction is 
neglected. If the outstanding stock of public debt is small (or zero on average), this 
channel can be neglected. When the level of public debt is zero under the steady state, 
0 = b s . The optimality condition of (10.a) and (10.b) becomes simpler as 
 
( ) 0 1 , 1 1 = − + − t t t ϕ ϕ π         ( 1 3 . a )  
0 2 1 = − − t y t t b y ϕ κϕ λ   .        ( 1 3 . b )   
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The flexible inflation-targeting rule is changed as 
 
() () 0 1 2 1 1 2 1 = − − − + − − − − t t t
y
t t t E
b
y y ϕ ϕ
κ κ
λ
π   .       (14) 
 
Unlike (11) or (12), the inflation rate is not affected by the past expectation error of the 
marginal cost of public funds.   
 
(d) State-contingent public debts are available 
When the government issues state-contingent public debts and conducts a 
sophisticated debt management policy, it holds 
 
1 , 2 2 + = t t ϕ ϕ   .         ( 1 5 )  
 
Substituting (15) into (10.a) reduces to   
 
() 0 1 = − + − t t t y y
κ
λ
π   ,        ( 1 6 )  
 
which is very similar to the well-known inflation targeting rule in the analysis of 
monetary policy. One important difference is that equation (16) cares about the 
deviation of output from its efficient level.   
When tax policy is used as a policy variable, it can offset the exogenous shocks of 
the new Keynesian Phillips curve. Therefore, the output can reach its efficient level. 
From the viewpoint of remedying sticky price adjustment, perfect output stabilization is 
achieved.  
 
(e) Monetary policy does not care fiscal concern 
When the difference of natural output and efficient output is constant 
(
* x x y t t − = ) and the central bank can commit to future policy, the optimal policy is 
derived through maximizing the Lagrangian    
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t t t t t t
t x x x E βπ κ π ϕ λ π β  .    (17) 
 
In order to focus on the discussion of monetary policy management, the model 
assumes the difference between natural output and efficient output are constant, 
* x x y t t − = . 
If the central bank can commit to the future policy, the following equation is 
employed as the flexible inflation-targeting rule:   
 
() 0 1 = − + − t t t x x
κ
λ
π   ,        ( 1 8 )  
 
or, the following equation is employed as the flexible price level-targeting rule:   
 
p x p t t = +
κ
λ
  ,         ( 1 9 )  
 
where the inflation rate is π , the log of the price level as p , and the log of target price 
level as  p . 
 
2.5 Summary of discussion 
Interactions between monetary and fiscal policy crucially depends on the 
specification of policy variables that fiscal policy uses. However, a general rule is that 
when monetary policy is capable of dealing with sticky price adjustment, a primary 
concern of fiscal authority should be to remedy the resource allocation. Fiscal policy 
aims at narrowing the gap between natural output and efficient output by changing the 
tax rate in the new Keynesian Phillips curve. It also attempts to equalize the marginal 
cost of spending. Sophisticated debt management policy may be useful for this purpose. 
The unexpected inflation should not be used as a primary policy instrument of tax 
smoothing. 
In some cases, concerns of the central bank and the fiscal authority are to be  
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interplayed. Such an example is when fiscal policy is unable to equalize the marginal 
cost of spending. As shown in equation (10.a), the inflation targeting rule is aware of the 
movement of the marginal cost of government spending. On the other hand, when there 
are limitations to monetary policy, fiscal policy has the additional concern acting as a 
stabilization policy.
4  
                                                  
4 Eggertsson and Woodford (2004) examined such a case when the zero lower 
bound of nominal interest rate is binding.  
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3.  Fiscal Version of Taylor Rule   
 
3.1 Empirical specification and United States experience 
The flexible-inflation targeting rule (18) of monetary policy can be transformed 
into an instrument rule which represents the nominal short-term interest rate as a 
function of the inflation rate and the output gap.
5 While fiscal policy can be 
transformed into this type of instrument rule, a simpler policy rule had already been 
considered and empirically analyzed by Taylor (2000) in his focus on the response of 
the structural (or cyclically-adjusted) budget surplus.
6  
The following special case of the model in Section 2 can be represented as a fiscal 
version of the Taylor rule.   
When 0 = b s , the dynamic equation for the real debt can be transformed as 
 
( ) () ( ) t t t t t t y t t t t f f E b y b b b b E + − − − − − = − + − − 1
*
1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 ˆ ˆ β τ τ β β τ  .     (20) 
 
The left hand side of (20) corresponds to the budget deficit. The first term on the right 
hand side represents the interest payment of debt, the second term is a change in tax 
revenue due to cyclical movements of output
7, the third term is a change in tax revenue 
due to the shift of tax policy, and the last two terms represent the movement of fiscal 
shock. If the other terms are not changed by a cyclical movement, the structural balance 
will not respond to the output gap
8. One explicit case is when there is no external 
change in fiscal demands ( 0 = f ) and the tax rate is not a policy variable.   
The response of the structural balance to a cyclical movement provides insightful 
information of the nature of fiscal policy. Taylor (2000) conducted the following 
                                                  
5 They may be a current, past or expected future value, depending on the 
specification of the model.   
6  The structural balance of government is the financial balance when the economy 
was at its natural level. It has been used as a measure of the discretionary fiscal policy. 
7 Since  y and the output gap (x) are different, the second term is not exactly equal 
to the structural balance. However, since it measures a change in fiscal balance given 
the policy, it does not correspond to the structural balance.   
8 On the other hand, if the tax rate is used as a policy variable but perfect output 
stabilization is impossible, the structural balance may be correlated with a cyclical 
movement of output.    
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empirical analysis, and examined the role of fiscal policy as a stabilization policy in 
post WWII United States. The structural, cyclical and financial balance (a positive value 
means a surplus) is assumed to be a linear function of the output gap. We denote a 
structural balance as 
S s , a cyclical balance as 
C s , and the output gap as x:  
 
x a a s
S
1 0 + =         ( 2 1 . a )  
x a s
C
2 =   .          ( 2 1 . b )  
 
Actual fiscal balance is represented as   
 
() x a a a s
G
2 1 0 + + = α   .        ( 2 1 . c )  
 
Three policy positions stand out when we focus on the response of the structural 
budget balance to a cyclical movement of output.   
(1) When the government maintains the balanced budget,  0 2 1 = + a a . Cyclical 
balance is likely to be procyclical ( 0 2 > a ), because during a recession, social security 
expenditures increase and tax revenue decreases. Therefore, the structural balance under 
a balanced budget should be in a surplus during a recession ( 0 1 < a ). It is now 
recognized that the balanced budget principle is not preferable because while it 
stimulates the economy during a boom, it dampens the economy during a recession. 
Thus, policy becomes the factor which destabilizes the economy.   
(2) The automatic stabilizer implies  0 1 = a ; a structural balance does not correlate 
with the output gap because policy does not react to the business cycle.  2 a  
demonstrates the strength of the automatic stabilizer because the actual balance reflects 
the movement of cyclical balance.   
(3) Under an active fiscal policy, a structural balance runs a deficit during recession, 
and a structural balance is positively correlated with the business cycle ( 0 1 > a ).  
 
From his analysis of the United States between 1960 and 1999, Taylor (2000) 
found that, while the structural balance was hardly influenced, a 1.0 percentage point 
decrease in the output gap caused a 0.5 percentage point decrease in the actual fiscal  
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balance. This finding indicated that fiscal policy in the United States has acted as an 
automatic stabilizer. Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) measured the quantitative 
magnitude of the automatic stabilizer, and reported that an eight percent shock to GDP 
was counterbalanced by the automatic stabilizer. Thus, the automatic stabilizer has 
played an important role in fiscal policy for the United States.
9  Romer (1999) has added 
to these findings by identifying that this stabilization policy had significantly 
contributed to the US’s mild business cycle.   
 
3.2 Cross country analysis 
Gali and Perotti (2003) examined the role of discretionary fiscal policy, using 
OECD country data from 1980 to 2002. Their primary concern is how the Maastricht 
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact affected fiscal management style of EU 
countries. From their panel data estimation, they found that fiscal policy had become 
more countercyclical in the post-Maastricht period (1992-2000). They grouped 19 
countries into EMU countries (11), Non-EMU EU countries (3), and other OECD 
countries (5), and ran a panel data regression for each group. They added government 
debt as a ratio of potential GDP and the lagged value of the dependent variable to 
explanatory variables of equation (21.a). Since the budget is planned before that fiscal 
year, discretionary fiscal policy responds to the expected value of the output gap. Gali 
and Perotti (2003) instrumented the output gap using past values of the output gap in a 
country and another group or country (the sum of EU countries for the US, the US for 
other countries).   
For a group of EMU countries, fiscal policy was procyclical in the pre-Maastricht 
period (1980-1991), but the coefficient was not statistically significant in the 
post-Maastricht period. In other two panel data, fiscal policy moved from an automatic 
stabilizer to countercyclical, as shown in Table 3 of their paper. They concluded that 
there was a global trend in fiscal policy towards countercyclical and that the EMU 
countries lagged behind it.   
However, adding some qualification is in order. When the same equation is 
regressed with time series data of each country (Table 2 of their paper), most of the 
                                                  
9 For further discussion of historical developments, see Schultz (1996), Stein 
(1996) and Stiglitz (1997).    
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coefficients of the output gap are not statistically significant at 10 percent level (14 out 
of 19 countries in the post-Maastricht period). The difference in coefficients between 
the periods is not significant either (15 out of 19 countries). A straightforward 
interpretation of these facts is that the structural balance did not respond to the output 
gap before or after the Maastricht Treaty.   
Since the evidence of time series data may be imprecise due to few degrees of 
freedom in regressions, I conducted alternative empirical study, aiming at increasing the 
degree of freedom. To this end, I first covered a longer time span by using all of 
available data from the data source. Regression results of three samples are presented. 
The first one covers all available data, the second one consists of observations before 
1989, and the last is the period from 1985 to 2003. The latter two samples are 
overlapped because getting a larger degree of freedom is a prime concern. Secondly, I 
confined explanatory variables by estimating equation (21.a), while Gali and Perotti 
(2003) included lagged values of government net debt and structural balance in a set of 
explanatory variables.
10  
Tables 2 through 4 report regression results of equations (21.a) and (21.b) during 
1966 and 2003. The structural balance, the cyclical balance and the output gap were 
taken from OECD Economic Outlook Database (May 2005), and represented as a 
percent of potential GDP. My sample was restricted to the 21 countries OECD had 
structural balance data on.
11  
Table 2 reports results of instrumental variables regressions. I used the one-year lag 
of output gap of a country and the one-year lag of the average of output gap of all 
countries. In the sample after 1985, the coefficients of output gap were statistically 
significant in Australia, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In the sample before 
1989, the coefficient was not significant in 13 out of 19 countries. The number of 
statistically significant coefficients does not increase in the later period. Unlike Gali and 
Perotti (2003), a trend to discretionary fiscal policy is not found.   
Table 3 shows results of ordinary least squares regressions. When the government 
projects the output more sophisticatedly, there is a possibility that OLS estimation, 
                                                  
10 While I also ran the regressions that include these variables as explanatory 
variables, the results were not essentially altered. 
11 Unfortunately, Korea is dropped from my sample, because OECD did not 
estimate a structural balance of general government. Table 2: Response of Structural Balances to Output Gap in OECD Countries: Instrumental Variable Regressions
(A) (B) (C)
All periods before 1989 1985-2003
Australia 0.83 (0.24) ** 1.03 (0.56) * 0.75 (0.23) **
Austria 0.72 (0.31) 0.41 (0.27) 0.39 (0.24)
Belgium -0.07 (0.51) 0.11 (0.44) 0.34 (0.64)
Canada 0.30 (0.29) 0.22 (0.27) 0.18 (0.59)
Denmark 0.91 (0.31) ** 0.84 (0.37) ** 0.30 (0.24)
Finland 0.14 (0.09) -0.22 (0.22) 0.11 (0.08)
France 0.31 (0.21) 0.33 (0.17) * 0.00 (0.22)
Germany -0.40 (0.27)
Greece 0.08 (0.40) 0.54 (0.50) -0.19 (0.72)
Iceland -0.05 (0.16) -0.10 (0.24) -0.24 (0.22)
Ireland -0.10 (0.42) -0.72 (0.70) 0.21 (0.29)
Italy 0.38 (0.38) 0.63 (0.38) 0.41 (0.72)
Japan 0.30 (0.36) -0.56 (0.39) 0.54 (0.47)
Netherlands 0.01 (0.23) 0.09 (0.34) -0.10 (0.36)
New Zealand 0.20 (0.31)
Norway 0.00 (0.16) -0.64 (0.22) ** 0.41 (0.18) **
Portugal -0.18 (0.11) -0.31 (0.14) * -0.05 (0.12)
Spain 0.02 (0.17) -0.05 (0.14) 0.21 (0.23)
Sweden 0.90 (0.22) ** 1.10 (0.29) ** 0.79 (0.21) **
United Kingdom -0.19 (0.19) -0.25 (0.14) 0.32 (0.28)
United States  0.33 (0.19) * 0.18 (0.15) 0.51 (0.62)
Note) Numbers in parentheses are the standard error. ** and * indicate a statistically significant coefficient
at 5 percent level and at 10 percent level, respectively. Instrumental variables are the one-year lag of output
gap of the estimated countrry and the one-year lag of the average of output gaps of all countries.
In (A) and (B), sample periods depend on the availability of data for each country. In (C), the sample period
is from 1992 to 2003 for Germany, and from 1988 to 2003 for New Zealand.
Source) Data are taken from OECD Economic Outlook Vol. 77 (May 2005) Database.Table 3: Response of Structural Balances to Output Gap in OECD Countries:
Ordinary Least Squares Regressions
(A) (B) (C)
All periods before 1989 1985-2003
Australia 0.53 (0.15) ** 0.37 (0.22) 0.68 (0.19) **
Austria 0.14 (0.15) 0.27 (0.17) 0.07 (0.19)
Belgium -0.14 (0.38) 0.21 (0.33) 0.30 (0.52)
Canada 0.33 (0.21) 0.17 (0.20) 0.39 (0.41)
Denmark 0.50 (0.19) ** 0.72 (0.25) ** 0.12 (0.18)
Finland 0.09 (0.08) -0.41 (0.18) ** 0.11 (0.06)
France 0.26 (0.16) 0.27 (0.12) ** -0.06 (0.18)
Germany -0.25 (0.15) -0.25 (0.14)
Greece 0.27 (0.30) 0.44 (0.34) -0.41 (0.56)
Iceland -0.08 (0.12) -0.10 (0.24) -0.18 (0.15)
Ireland 0.31 (0.34) -0.51 (0.56) 0.37 (0.24)
Italy 0.61 (0.27) ** 0.63 (0.26) ** 0.92 (0.61)
Japan 0.47 (0.27) * -0.30 (0.32) 0.75 (0.34) **
Netherlands -0.11 (0.16) -0.04 (0.21) -0.21 (0.26)
New Zealand 0.40 (0.25) 0.40 (0.25)
Norway -0.06 (0.14) -0.58 (0.20) ** 0.28 (0.16)
Portugal -0.15 (0.09) -0.20 (0.13) -0.05 (0.11)
Spain 0.03 (0.15) -0.28 (0.13) 0.08 (0.20)
Sweden 0.84 (0.19) ** 1.00 (0.27) ** 0.82 (0.18) **
United Kingdom -0.11 (0.15) -0.29 (0.12) ** 0.45 (0.22) **
United States  0.27 (0.12) ** 0.19 (0.11) * 0.49 (0.40)
Note) Numbers in parentheses are the standard error. ** and * indicate a statistically significant coefficient
at 5 percent level and at 10 percent level, respectively. OLS estimation.
In (A) and (B), sample periods depend on the availability of data for each country. In (C), the sample period
is from 1991 to 2003 for Germany, and from 1987 to 2003 for New Zealand.
Source) Data are taken from OECD Economic Outlook Vol. 77  (May 2005) Database. 
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which implicitly assumes the perfect foresight of the output gap, becomes a better 
approximation to the reality. In the period after 1985, the coefficient was not statistically 
significant in 17 out of 21 countries. Based on these findings, it appears that the 
majority of developed countries do not actively use fiscal policy as a stabilization policy. 
While its quantitative magnitude differs among countries, fiscal policy is instead used as 
an automatic stabilizer. On the other hand, a statistically significant response regarding 
structural balance was found in Australia, Japan, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
Sweden’s coefficient was the most significant. In Figure 1(A), the structural balance and 
the output gap in Sweden demonstrates the synchronized movement. Japan’s coefficient 
of 0.75 is high as well. Those of Australia and the United Kingdom follow.   
OLS regression results of equation (21.b) are reported in column (A) of Table 4
12. 
While all are statistically significant, the response of the cyclical balance differed 
among countries. Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) and the 
Netherlands have large coefficients ( 2 a ). Japan has the lowest value, 0.22. Therefore, 
Japan’s characteristics are unique; its structural balance responds strongly to the output 
gap, while the magnitude of an automatic stabilizer is the smallest among the sample. 
Table 2 also draws the OECD’s estimate of the elasticity of total balance with respect to 
the output gap from Sources and Methods of the OECD Economic Outlook. Since this 
elasticity captures the cyclical movement of fiscal balance, it is highly correlated with 
the cyclical balance (as a share of GDP).   
                                                  
12 The constant term is added in the estimated equation. Since the response to the 
actual business conditions is the focus of an automatic stabilizer, I do not instrument the 

















































structural balance output gapTable 4: Response of Cyclical Balances to Output Gap in OECD Countries
(A) (B)
Cyclical balance Elasticity of
fiscal balance
Australia 0.30 (0.01) ** 0.25
Austria 0.32 (0.01) ** 0.30
Belgium 0.69 (0.01) ** 0.61
Canada 0.46 (0.01) ** 0.39
Denmark 0.78 (0.01) ** 0.75
Finland 0.72 (0.02) ** 0.64
France 0.42 (0.00) ** 0.42
Germany 0.69 (0.15) ** 0.51
Greece 0.47 (0.01) ** 0.44
Iceland 0.40 (0.01) **
Ireland 0.39 (0.01) ** 0.31
Italy 0.57 (0.04) ** 0.48
Japan 0.22 (0.01) ** 0.26
Netherlands 0.79 (0.02) ** 0.64
New Zealand 0.57 (0.01) ** 0.53
Norway 0.92 (0.26) ** 0.63
Portugal 0.36 (0.01) ** 0.39
Spain 0.42 (0.01) ** 0.40
Sweden 0.77 (0.01) ** 0.68
United Kingdom 0.55 (0.06) ** 0.50
United States  0.28 (0.00) ** 0.25
Note) Numbers in parentheses are the standard error. ** and
* indicate a statistically significant coefficient at 5 percent
level and at 10 percent level. The sample period is from 1985
to 2003 except Germany and New Zealand. The sample
period is from 1991 to 2003 for Germany, and from 1987 to
2003 for New Zealand. (A) is an estimated coefficient of
cyclical balance when it is regresed on the output gap.
Cyclical balance is obtained by deducting the structural
balance from fiscal balance. (B) is OECD's estimate of the
elasticity of fiscal balance to output.
Source) (A) Data are taken from OECD Economic Outlook
Vol. 77 (May 2005) Database. (B) Sources and Methods of 
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4. Japanese  experiences 
 
It is unwise to regard the regression results in Tables 2 and 3 as the definite picture 
of fiscal management in developed countries. The following reservations must be stated. 
The Output gap is estimated with a significant margin of error. As pointed out in 
Orphanides (2000), the estimate of the output gap may be sensitive to when it was 
estimated. Since I confined the sample to the most recent years, the data contains a 
limited number of cycles. The estimated coefficient may not reflect a systematic 
response to the business cycle but instead reflect a particular episode, one which is not 
relevant to stabilization policy. The response of the structural balance to changes in the 
economy can be delayed and our uniform specification of the estimated equation does 
not capture the differing lag structures of each country. Therefore, this kind of 
cross-country study should be supplemented by a careful analysis of a particular 
country.  
 
4.1 Alternative analysis of fiscal Taylor rule   
This section takes a closer look at the Japanese situation. I found in the last section 
that Japanese fiscal policy takes a unique position when compared to a majority of 
OECD countries. To further substantiate my results, it is necessary to execute an 
analysis using alternative data. If the secondary study does not coincide with my results, 
then the cross-country study produced a more cohesive result for developed countries. 
But, if the analysis reveals that Japan really is a distinctive case, then my findings on a 
variety of fiscal policy stances becomes more secured.   
A natural level of output or structural balance of the government has been 
occasionally estimated by Japanese researchers (for example, Yui, 1983, Homma et. al, 
1987, Yoshida and Fukui, 2000, and Nishizaki and Nakagawa, 2000) and the Cabinet 
Office (formerly Economic Planning Agency). These studies aid in our examination of 
the robustness of the findings in Section 3.   
Table 5 draws on my previous paper’s empirical analysis (Iwamoto, 2002). The 
methodology is the same, and the regression analysis of the preceding section was used. 
The data was taken from different sources such as the Economic Planning Agency’s 
Economic White Paper (2000), Nishizaki and Nakagawa (2000), OECD Economic Table 5: The Response of Structural and Cyclical Balances to Output gap
Source Structural Balance Cyclical Balance
Period
Economic Planning Agency (2000) 1.09 0.35
1983-1998 (0.23) (0.04)
Nishizaki and Nakagawa (2000) 0.77 0.36
1983-1999 (0.13) (0.01)
OECD (2001) 0.37 0.20
1985-2000 (0.45) (0.01)
Yoshida and Fukui (2000) 0.38 0.33
1983-2000 (0.52) (0.05)
Note) ɹNumbers are an estimated coefficient. Numbers in parenthesis are the
standard error.
Source) Iwamoto (2002). 
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Outlook No. 70 (2001), and Yoshida and Fukui (2000). I chose to report the estimation 
using the OECD data from a previous issue of OECD Economic Outlook, because one 
can check whether regression results vary according to the time and period measured.  
As for the reaction of structural balance, the coefficient was not significant in both 
OECD (2001) and Yoshida and Fukui (2000). On the other hand, the Economic 
Planning Agency (2000) and Nishizaki and Nakagawa (2000) obtained statistically 
significant coefficients of 0.77 to 1.09 respectively.   
The difference in the results stems from the difference in the estimated movement 
of the output gap in the latter half of 1990s. Figure 2(A) shows the movement of the 
output gap used in Table 5. The output gap of OECD (2001) and Yoshida and Fukui 
(2000) declined after 1988, while data from the Economic Planning Agency (2000) and 
Nishizaki and Nakagawa (2000) showed that the output gap improved in the latter half 
of 1990s. Figure 1(B) shows that the structural balance has deteriorated steadily in 
1990s, except for 1997 when financial structural reform was enacted. Therefore, while 
structural balance and output level were synchronized according to the Economic 
Planning Agency (2000) and Nishizaki and Nakagawa (2000), data from the OECD 
(2001) and Yoshida and Fukui (2000) claimed that the two variables diverged in later 
periods of the sample. That is why the former had a statistically significant coefficient 
while the latter did not.   
Since the estimation of the output gap influences the regression, one has to 
determine the most reliable estimate of the output gap. The Economic Planning Agency 
(2000) and Nishizaki and Nakagawa (2000) employed a careful estimation method, and 
it appears to be consistent with other business indicators. Therefore, taking their results 
into an account, my research shows that the Japanese structural balance fundamentally 
responds to the output gap. However, this finding requires further qualification as a 
driving force of the structural balance might not be included in the above regression 
analysis. Another possible explanation of the co-movement of the structural balance and 
the output gap is that they were driven by a trend which was headed in the same 
direction. For example, although both the structural balance and the output gap showed 
long-term improvement in the 1980’s, they could have been driven by different factors 
such as fiscal reconstruction.   
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which started in the latter half of the 1970’s. They found that two factors played an 
important role in creating the deficit. First, the inertia of nominal spending growth was 
strong enough to continue after the decline of nominal economic growth. The other is 
that the policymakers were optimistic about introducing a new sales tax, even though 
the structural deficit followed the economic downturn. Their findings imply cyclical 
factors did not largely impact the budget deficit.   
Homma et al. (1987) attempted to eliminate the influence of a long-term trend by 
taking a first-order difference of each variable. Observations from 1970 to 1983 showed 
that the structural balance and the output gap only moved in opposite directions from 
1970-73. The remainder of the time the structural balance and output gap moved 
together. However, Homma et al. thought that fiscal policy actively responded to the 
business cycle. They interpreted that the comovement of the structural balance and 




4.2 Regime shift in 2001 
In spring of 2001, Mr. Junichiro Koizumi, who favored emphasizing fiscal 
adjustment, became prime minister. A new idea of fiscal management was formulated 
                                                  
13 Among the existing literature of Japanese fiscal policy, there are contrasting 
views on whether Japanese fiscal policy has played an active role in stabilizing the 
economy. Noguchi (1983) provocatively argued that Japan had seldomly taken 
Keynesian policy since 1955. He confined Keynesian policy on an expansionary fiscal 
policy, and pointed out that such a policy was only enacted in FY 1965 Supplementary 
Budget. 
Okazaki (1998) took an opposing view. He put emphasis on “stabilization,” and 
focused on a broader policy by including contractionary policies. He pointed out that 
discretionary fiscal policy was actively used since 1965 and had been occasionally used 
before 1965. In 1980’s, when the fiscal reconstruction became a top priority, economic 
stimulus measures in the recession period became mild. However, he regarded this 
period as exceptional. He also pointed out that the reliance of discretionary policy was 
caused by the fact that a Keynesian idea had widely infiltrated the policy makers.   
Two points may contribute to creating these different views. First, They focused on 
different policies. Okazaki (1998) included the contractionary policy and observed that 
it was widely taken up during the high growth era, while Noguchi (1983) limited 
Keynesian policy to the expansionary policy. Secondly, narrative analysis can be 
influenced by subjective judgment.  
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and described in the Preliminary Report
14  of the Fiscal System Council.   
The Report summarized the experience of fiscal policy after the collapse of the 
“bubble economy” as: 
“During this period Japan implemented a total of 11 economic stimulus packages 
(a scale of activity totaling more than 130 trillion yen) as part of supplementary 
budgets. Nevertheless, Japan's economic growth rate has generally remained sluggish 
and a recovery centered on private demand was seen only for very short periods. 
The problems concerning fiscal management during this period were 
concentrated in two areas. 
The first is that by focusing unduly on the problem of demand shortage as the 
cause of economic stagnation, the government underestimated the seriousness of the 
non-performing loan problem in the financial system. … 
The second problem is that from a viewpoint of economic stabilization 
(economic adjustment), the government relied too heavily on the use of expansionary 
fiscal policy. Two factors acting as restrictive conditions when giving fiscal policy an 
economic stabilization function are (a) not to sacrifice resource allocation efficiency 
and (b) ensure that it is possible to maintain the fiscal policy (sustainability). In 
addition fiscal policy has the defect of being less flexible than monetary policy. It 
must therefore be said that during the 1990s, Japan came to rely too excessively on 
fiscal policies that exceeded the limits permitted by these restrictive conditions. 
As a result of these problems, the central government's efforts failed to achieve 
the expected intent of lifting the economy. They also left fiscal policy itself with two 
serious structural problems by (a) reducing the confidence in resource allocation 
efficiency and (b) fanning doubts with regard to the sustainability of fiscal stimulus.” 
 
Its very critical stance to the past policy action was very unique and impressive, 
because the government has been always reluctant to admit that they made a mistake.   
After the report reviewed the past experiences, it tried to set a new fiscal 
management style that performed as a stabilization policy. The Report said   
“(T)he government in Japan as well should use monetary policy principally for 
its economic stabilization function, and use fiscal policy for its resource allocation 
function while maintaining fiscal discipline. Fiscal policy has the function of easing 
business fluctuations because of its automatic stabilization mechanism (“built-in 
stabilizers”) supplementing this with discretionary use of fiscal
15 policy should be 
limited to only those situations where a recession is extremely serious and the latitude 
for exercising monetary policy is extremely limited.” 
 
4.3 Three issues of Japanese Fiscal Policy 
Japanese fiscal policy must tackle three difficult problems.   
                                                  
14  From unknown reasons, no final report was released.   
15 In the English text of this Report, this word was read as “monetary.” From the 
original Japanese text, it should have been “fiscal.” I then corrected it here.    
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(a) Sustainability of the budget 
While the actual fiscal policy after FY2002 followed the Preliminary Report to 
some extent, it did not follow it in all aspects. A positive phenomenon resulting from the 
report was the dramatic decline of public works in the following years. However, the 
government cut taxes in FY 2002, and the budget continued to run a huge deficit. From 
Figure 1(B), we can see that the structural balance did not dramatically improve.   
With the economy in a weak condition, there was strong pressure to practice a 
more expansionary fiscal policy. While the resulting policy change was not intended to 
further expand Japan’s fiscal stance, it did not stop expansionary fiscal policy from 
occurring. This has become a problem. Years of aggressive expansionary policy have 
led citizens to believe this is not an extreme policy position.   
As shown in Figure 3, the accumulation of government debt has not subsided. The 
way to rescue our budget is obvious. The government has to improve its primary 
balance and steadily decrease the ratio of government debt to GDP. However, it will 
take time to achieve a primary surplus because the primary deficit of central and local 
governments combined is at 4 percent of the GDP (FY2004).   
In the beginning of 2002, the Japanese government aimed at achieving a budget 
surplus by early 2010. Today the target is set at FY2012. This target is consistent with 
the recent trends, which show an increase of the primary surplus by 0.5 percent of GDP 
each year. After that, it will be necessary to increase the surplus to decrease the amount 
of government debt. Fiscal adjustment is a time-consuming process.   
 
(b) Monetary policy 
The Report from the Fiscal System Council stated that a discretionary use of fiscal 
policy should be limited to cases where monetary policy options are extremely limited. 
With the nominal interest rate hitting its lower bound, the current Japanese situation 
may be judged as such a situation. However, a traditional style of fiscal expansion is not 
a serious choice, given the huge size of the deficit. Other fiscal policy options have been 
extensively discussed.   
When contemplating the possibility of a zero nominal interest rate, two 
interpretations come to the forefront. First is the liquidity trap, where the natural interest 
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Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) examined such a possibility where the policy 
gradually raised the consumption tax in order to create inflation and escape from the 
liquidity trap. The other is a “deflationary trap,” in which the natural interest rate is 
positive, but a persistent zero interest rate sustains an equilibrium deflation. Among 
others, Benhabib, Schmit-Grohe and Uribe (2002), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) 
and Iwamoto (2005) have discussed the possibility that a non-Ricardian policy could 
rescue the economy from such a trap. Iwamoto (2005) argued that a necessary 
money-financed tax cut would be around 2 trillion yen. The puzzle is whether or not the 
current massive budget deficit is non-Ricardian enough to escape from a deflationary 
trap.  
 
(c) Magnitude of an automatic stabilizer 
When fiscal policy is confined to an automatic stabilizer, its magnitude becomes 
important. According to OECD’s estimates as well as my analysis, Japan’s automatic 
stabilizer has the lowest magnitude. Table 6 highlights the OECD’s estimate of the 
elasticity of each budget item with respect to output between Japan and the OECD 
average. The elasticity of corporate tax revenue is the largest in Japan. However, the 
elasticity of other budget items is quite low; for example, the elasticity of other tax 
revenues and social security contributions are the lowest or the second lowest. A lower 
share of tax revenues to income may be the reason for this low elasticity. Structural tax 
reform, a tax increase, and the restoration of fiscal discipline will be necessary in the 
near future.   Table 6: Elasticities of Budget Items with Respect to the Output Gap
Elasticity Japan OECD average
Corporate tax 2.1 1.24
Personal tax 0.4 1.05
Indirect tax 0.5 0.89
Social Security tax 0.3 0.82
Current expenditure -0.1 -0.21
Total balance 0.26 0.47
Source) Sources and Methods of the OECD Economic
Outlook, OECD Economics Department. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
This paper explored how monetary policy and fiscal policy synchronize and 
interact as a stabilization policy. Interactions between monetary and fiscal policy 
crucially depend on the specific policy variables utilized by fiscal policy. However, a 
general rule is that when monetary policy is capable of dealing with sticky price 
adjustment, a primary concern of fiscal authority should be to remedy resource 
allocation. My regression study using cross-country data shows that a majority of 
OECD countries employs fiscal policy as an automatic stabilizer.   
Japan has relied heavily on discretionary fiscal policy. In the late 1990s, the 
Japanese government attempted a very aggressive fiscal expansion in order to recover 
the economy as it was suffering from a domestic and international financial crisis. The 
resulting stagnant economy and inefficient spending has led policymakers to change 
their thoughts regarding fiscal policy. However, as I discussed throughout the paper, the 
complete implementation of monetary policy in Japan will take considerable time. 
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